



THE ROLE OF MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOFT POWER IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA

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ABSTRACT

Soft Power is a relatively new term that has emerged in international relations. Coined by Joseph S. Nye in the 1990s, it emphasizes on power embedded in culture and exerting influence through non-coercive forms. Soft power, however, defines power predominantly in terms of power relations among states and gives little or no significance to power relations within a state. Furthermore, even though considerable literature has been written on the role of the military in inter-state relations, there is little research on the internal exercise of soft power through military means. Taking a step further, this paper seeks to analyze the internal soft power of the military in post-war Sri Lanka by opening a new window to look at the often criticized development interventions of the armed forces in the aftermath of the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Key Words: Soft Power, Hard Power, Military Soft Power, National Security

INTRODUCTION

The protracted war of almost three decades in Sri Lanka ended with hopes for reconciliation, peace, and nation building. While much has been written and debated on the role of the military during war, the post-war scenario too seems preoccupied with the definitional

overuse of terms such as 'militarization'. The role and importance of the military in a post-war environment can be analyzed using various approaches as it has varying dynamics depending on the environment which a war emanates from. When a war ends, the significant attention and recognition given to the military and their activities tend to decline sometimes to the point of extinction and the post-war orientation of the military eventually turns towards aspects such as rehabilitation, reconciliation and nation building, leaving little discussion on the transformation of the nature of military power in a post-war

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scenario. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the 'soft power of the military' in post war Sri Lanka. Theoretically, the term 'soft power' is predominantly used to define the power of one nation over another and has never been used to analyze internal power relations of a country. The paper is contextually relevant as the concept of 'soft power' is brought into discussion in light of post-war Sri Lanka's developments that show how soft power has filled the void created by the visible reduction of military hard power that was largely used during the armed conflict. In other words this paper is aimed at countering the notion of looking at the military as less useful or diminishing as a source of security than it once was. It also intends to illuminate the term 'soft power' by underscoring that military though termed a form of hard power has myriads of soft power aspects that can be fruitfully used in a post-war environment such as found in Sri Lanka.

SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER

Most definitions of international relations involve power. Adding to the discourse, the term 'soft power' was introduced by Joseph S. Nye in an article in the *Foreign Policy Journal* in 1990 and then in the ensuing year in his acclaimed book 'Bound to lead: the changing Nature of American Power'. The idea was then widely accepted by international relations academics and students alike. Soft power according to Nye includes getting others to do what one wants by influence rather than coercion (Nye, 1990). In other words, soft power is cultural power. A country's soft power comes from three resources namely "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values

(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)" (Nye, 2006). Soft power defines the influence and attraction that a nation possesses and acquires and the ability of a nation to draw others to its culture and ideas. Soft Power enables nations to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. Nye distinguishes between 'hard power' and 'soft power' and thus categorizes military power and economic power as hard power while soft power is defined as 'getting others to do what you want'. According to Nye, soft power draws largely from the values of a country which are expressed in its culture, internal policies, and its international conduct. The subtleties of a culture, values, and opinions often have deep effects upon the community at large and they are more powerful and penetrative than coercion.

Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change (Nye 1990, p. 167).

Nye distinguishes between hard and soft power. Hard power according to Nye includes economic sanctions and military power. For example, he identifies hard power as "the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will" (Nye 1990, p. 167). Wilson (2008) describes hard power as coercion which involves military intervention, coercive diplomacy,

and economic sanctions to enforce national interest. According to Shashi Tharoor (2009) a country's soft power emerges from the world's perceptions of what that country is all about. The associations and attitudes conjured up in the global imagination by the mere mention of a country's name is often a more accurate gauge of its soft power than a dispassionate analysis of its foreign policies. According to his view hard power is "exercised; soft power is evoked" (Tharoor 2009).

Wagner (2005) too emphasizes that;

Ideally hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. In contrast to this soft power strategies emphasize common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic co-operation in order to achieve common solutions.

Not only Nye, but various other scholars too have loosely defined military hard power leaving no room for further analysis as to what that hard power really entails and endorses. Cooper (2004) for example states that hard power is often 'frightening and unpleasant'. For many, hard power is nothing but military intervention and similar coercive means that is used to induce others to get one's objective accomplished. The reason for the close association of hard power with the military lies in the definition and not in the empirical existence of the term. For example, many analysts side hard power with the application of military power thereby overlooking the soft power aspect of the military. Baldwin thus opines that;

Apparently, the tangibility of resources is not an essential defining characteristic of soft power, but rather an empirical association. Military force, which many understand to be the prototypical example of hard power, only 'appears to be a defining characteristic of hard power' ... since it can also be used to produce soft power. This amalgamation of the discussion of defining characteristics of soft power with empirical observations about it has generated needless confusion. Future research on soft power should clearly distinguish between definitional matters and empirical ones. (Baldwin 2013, p.289)

Kaplan (2013) states that "Hard power has not been in vogue since the Iraq War turned bad in about 2004." This shows that hard power and soft power have been looked upon from an American perspective and have been subjected to generalizations in the discussions that followed the introduction of the concept.

One distinct flaw in Joseph Nye's idea of soft power is that it is aimed at USA's foreign policy, and the ensuing discussions too appear to have been woven around America's foreign policy, public diplomacy and its soft power. Another drawback in the soft power concept is that it is predominantly used to analyze inter-state relations than intra-state relations. In other words, this fails to analyze the soft power aspect of internal statecraft and focuses more on diplomatic relations of states and the behaviour of states towards one another. In the discussion of soft power it is important to note that internal power too has a myriad of soft power aspects that can be exercised upon people through different ways. Just as states use diplomacy to attract other states, a government too

uses soft power to a great extent to win the hearts and minds of its countrymen through different means.

Soft Power, however, is fluid by nature and cannot be defined in purely cultural terms. By trying to define something intangible by specific theoretical terms may fail to capture its intricacies. For example, a certain aspect of culture which one might feel as influential might sound offensive and invasive to another. Thus, Nye (2006) notes that;

Soft power is not good per se, and it is not always better than hard power. Nobody likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. Like any form of power, it can be wielded for good or bad purposes, and these often vary with the eye of the beholder. Bin Laden possesses a great deal of soft power in the eyes of his acolytes, but that does not make his actions good from an American point of view. It is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms. If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I can persuade you with a false claim that I will save the world. The second means depends upon attraction or soft power, but the result remains theft in both instances.

Soft Power thus has undesirable aspects that could have hard implications on its recipients. For example brainwashing one to be a terrorist could have violent ramifications than providing armed combat practice to a terrorist. Similarly, to convince another of one's acts through non-coercive means can generate softer influences whose intangible impact would be all the more enduring. In other words, what is expected from the expansion of military power in a post-war period where hard power is deemed to be obsolete is to achieve a state of mind in the public which believes in the power of the

military within a broader national security establishment.

Despite the recognition of soft power in international relations by many, the power of the military in a post-war environment has been given scanty attention in the discussion of soft power. Even the available literature on soft power of the military focuses heavily on the US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan which has missed out a lot on other wars and case specific scenarios. It is this scantily researched aspect of military soft power that the paper seeks to analyze in the next section.

SOFT POWER ASPECT OF THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY: A WARTIME AND POST-WAR ANALYSIS

Calusewitz (1873) notes that;

every war is unique because of the varying strengths and weaknesses of the armies involved, the impossibility of obtaining full and accurate intelligence about the enemy, the variable terrains on which it is fought, the unpredictability of the weather conditions, and the role played by sheer chance (p. 15).

Similarly every post-war scenario too tends to be different. The factors that make one post-war situation different from another range from the will and the readiness of the government to endorse nation building initiatives to the will and readiness of the people to accept the post-war changes. In the case of Sri Lanka, the military has wielded substantial power within the country through its presence in the nation building efforts launched by the government since 2009. Military might that is predominantly considered to yield hard power has taken a shift towards its softer aspects. In other words, the military in Sri Lanka has been

able to demonstrate its power in softer ways internally. This less discussed internal soft power of the military can be utilized to explain and analyze internal soft power play of statecraft. This also would help add a different interpretation to 'militarization' as it is positioned and understood within the post-war power discourse of a state like Sri Lanka.

One distinct characteristic of the thirty-year long battle between the LTTE and the military of Sri Lanka was that it was fought amidst much contention. The contention was based on two assumptions; one on the international perception that the war cannot be won militarily alone and therefore a peace process led by international intervention is needed to bring about a peaceful solution, and the other is based on the highly debated idea that existed on theoretical platforms that the role of the military is declining. Joseph S. Nye (2010) states that the military entails more than mere guns and battalions and that the use of force in the contemporary times has taken a new path. The new path encompasses fighting against 'Fourth Generation Warfare' which does not take place in definable territory, but 'focuses on the enemy's society and political will to fight.' Nye (2010) upholds the opinion that

Military power remains important because it structures world politics. It is true that in many relationships and issues, military force is increasingly difficult or costly for states to use. But the fact that military power is not always sufficient in particular situations does not mean that it has lost the ability to structure expectations and shape political calculations.

Before deliberating on the soft power of the military of Sri Lanka in the post-

war era, it is essential to analyze the wartime scenario to check whether soft power actually existed in it, if so what it looked like and to analyze whether there has been a change of tone in the soft power of the military during war and post-war situations. It is also vital to explore whether the role of military has been diminishing since the end of the war.

The armed forces in Sri Lanka used all their hard power to defeat the LTTE in the thirty warring years. The human, economic, and psychological cost of the war is immense and testifies to the magnitude of the losses caused by the exercise of hard power. Gotabaya Rajapakse, the Defense Secretary of Sri Lanka, has officially revealed that 80,000 people have been killed in the 26-year war (Rajapakse, 2009). During the final phase of the war that commenced in 2006 the security forces, including the army, navy, the air force, police and the civil defense force, saw 6,261 personnel killed and 29,551 wounded. Though there are no official figures for the number of LTTE members killed in the war, the figures float between 15,000 and 22,000.

These huge losses reveal another aspect of the story. One may wonder as to how the Sri Lankan military forces were able to crush one of the deadliest military outfits despite such a heavy loss of lives. During the last phase of the battle, Sri Lanka Army alone recorded 3,000 recruits per month compared to 3,000 recruits per year prior to 2006 and the number of recruits has increased to 5,000 per month after the end of the war (Fonseka, 2009). The soft power created by the military due to the continuous victories Sri Lanka's armed forces achieved during the last years of the fourth Eelam War made a career with

the military attractive for the Sri Lankan youth. This attraction continued well into the post-war phase where the number of recruits to the military increased to address the need of more military personnel to protect the land captured from the grip of terrorists. This shows that the role of the military constantly and subtly exercised a form of soft power which influenced and tipped public opinion in its favour without involving coercion. The military operations which are an exercise of hard power engendered domestic psychological support from the masses in order to achieve clear military objectives. This was not entirely the work of presidential manipulation as many tend to think when it comes to ending the war through military means. Clausewitz observes;

Trophies apart, there is no accurate measure of loss of morale; hence in many cases the abandonment of the fight remains the only authentic proof of victory. This shame and humiliation, which must be distinguished from all other psychological consequences of the transformation of the balance, is an essential part of victory. It is the only element that affects public opinion outside the army that impresses the people and the governments of the two belligerents and their allies. (p.258)

Not only locally, internationally too Sri Lanka experienced a boost of global attention. During the Sixth Asia-Pacific Army Chiefs' Conference held in Tokyo, Japan 24-27 August 2009 which was co-hosted by the USA and Japan, many army chiefs had expressed their keen interest in making the future military academia focus on Sri Lanka as a case study. They had expressed their desire to send high level military groups to Sri Lanka

for this purpose. Those military chiefs also received a detailed account of the conduct of insurgency operations and the victory achieved over the LTTE from the then Commander of the Sri Lanka Army (Sri Lanka Army, 2009). This testifies to the fact that even military-to-military cooperation can establish transnational networks that enhance a country's soft power.

Continuous victories made by the military during the last phase rendered the LTTE cadres morally down and dispossessed them of their will to continue the struggle (Chandrapema, 2012). Such psychological loss is greater than mere physical destruction of the enemy. The number of LTTE surrenders soon before the victory and in its immediate aftermath shows the soft defeat of the enemy was much more effective than that of the victory achieved through the exercise of hard power.

When compared to similar situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US War on Terror has not been able to crush the enemy psychologically in a similar way. According to the Country Reports on Terrorism on South and Central Asia, although responsibility for security in Afghanistan has transitioned from the U.S. and international forces to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), infiltration remains high and in the year 2013 alone there were continuous attacks including 16 high profile attacks (US Department of State, 2013). It could be persuasively argued that such sustained infiltration would not have been possible if an element of popular support was not involved. Hence unlike the Sri Lankan armed forces, the international forces deployed to wage war in Iraq and

Afghanistan have not been able to claim public endorsement, thus leading to a situation in which the public could more easily relate to the terrorists.

Turning back to Sri Lanka, the nature of soft power of the Sri Lankan military during the war was mainly attraction induced, made so by the continuous victories it achieved in the fourth Eelam War. In post-war Sri Lanka hard power of the military was completely replaced by its soft counterpart. Soon after the war, there were a number of concerns that had to be dealt with immediately and without the use of force. These immediate post-war challenges included accommodating and ensuring the welfare of nearly 3,000,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); undertaking de-mining and reconstruction of infrastructure facilities; resettling the IDPs; rehabilitating nearly 12,000 ex-LTTE cadres and reintegrating them into the society (Rajapakse, 2013). Hence the role of the military had to be renegotiated to meet these new demands swiftly and efficiently.

That the use of military force is diminishing in its utility is a popular claim made by present day theorists drawing from the USA's experience with the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this may not provide sufficient justification for other wars like that of Sri Lanka. While there is a growing debate as to whether the role of the military is diminishing and should be diminished, the Sri Lankan experience seems to be countering the above debate as military might is being engaged in the contemporary development process in a soft and strategic manner. The military engagement in post-war reconstruction work has generated considerable social trust which is an essential component

of soft power. Arun Thambimuttu, commenting about the post-war nation building efforts of the government says that the army is very 'popular' in the North-Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka and the villagers want the Sri Lanka Army to build their roads, bridges and schools and refurbish their buildings as they believe that the military personnel will build their roads within a short period and more importantly without them having to pay bribes for political authority (Thambimuttu, 2013). Attributing the current nation building efforts by the military to 'militarization,' therefore, is a misinterpretation of the term and is lacking in the nuances of a theoretically sound analysis of a post-war society like Sri Lanka.

This is not to say that Sri Lanka's post-war scenario is completely devoid of militarization. M.V. Naidu (1985) says militarization constitutes 'gathering of arms, the raising of armies, the seeking of military bases and allies'. According to him while militarization denotes 'military build-up', militarism is a little different but intrinsically connected to militarization. It constitutes non material socio-psychological aspects such as 'moral values, behavioral patterns, emotional appeal etc'. He further states

Militarism is the attitudinal and behavioral element that mobilizes masses through values or beliefs that military capability is the most meaningful and effective instrument for achieving any or all national goals ...resorting to military build-up or militarism or both, produces different levels of militarization ... Both militarism and military build-up aim at military power, the capacity to influence others in order to gain political or economic advantage.

(Naidu 1985).

This influence, however, is 'hard' by nature rather than soft which results in a feeling of intimidation and disturbance by the military presence. Sri Lanka places 36th in the Global Militarization Index in 2013 that takes into account military expenditure, personnel and heavy weapons (Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2013). Hence it would be unrealistic to suggest that no militarization at all is happening in Sri Lanka. Rather, the case is that such militarization to a large extent enjoys support from the public.

Civilians seem drawn towards the military by the gamut of the nation building efforts initiated by the latter. Thus, soft power of the military has become very effective in claiming endorsement for itself and its projects, a phenomenon that has required no policy push on the part of the government. For power to be influential, those who are subjects of such influence have to either be unaware of it or have it so internalized that they do not pay any special attention to it at all. Therefore the soft power of the Sri Lankan military can be considered especially potent in the current circumstances.

However, the popular rhetoric of the West is that engaging the military in development projects constitutes 'militarization'. Moreover, Sri Lanka's situation has been compared with the military regimes that are in existence in some of the South Asian countries such as Pakistan. As South Asia provides a case for different patterns of military presence, the case of Sri Lanka needs to be distinguished from that of other nations. A further distinction is necessary between rule and role to

properly appreciate the military's role in post-war Sri Lanka.

What is the necessity of military intervention in post-war rebuilding? If no domestic mechanism existed in the immediate aftermath of the war, the post-war nation building process of 'weak states' like Sri Lanka would have required a lot of international support and intervention. However, needless to mention that such post-war development interventions of the international community in contemporary times have met with opposition. For example, the post war reconstruction work in Iraq by the United States invited much criticism for being corrupt and failing to build up a successful reconstruction programme (Smith, 2013). According to the Cost of War website, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to an increase in total military contracts to nearly \$400 billion and contracting done by the private sector has grown to such a level that, by 2011, there were more private contract employees involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than uniformed military personnel (Cost of War, 2013). Despite these huge investments in nation building efforts, Iraq's situation in retrospect remains the same. The Cost of War website claims that even though the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions resulted in the toppling of two of the world's most repressive regimes, Saddam Hussein's and that of the Taliban, democracy remains at peril.

This is in stark contrast to the Sri Lankan experience where the post-war reconstruction work was entirely undertaken by the military with little or no involvement of the government or the NGOs in the post-war nation building

projects. Call and Cousens (2008) writing on civilian and military peace builders observe that there is general distrust towards civilian involvement in post-war peace building efforts as it is the military that has gotten into the business of peace-building. This same faith is observable in the Sri Lankan context as well, where the activities and involvement of the military have so far received no allegations of financial misconduct and therefore have inspired people's trust in military development initiatives.

The term 'nation building' needs to be redefined in the case of Sri Lanka as the term has been generally used to refer to nation building efforts of failed states by external hands, often led by foreign assistance of powerful states to bring about democracy and governance. Colonel Jayne A. Carson of the United States Army defines nation building as intervention in the affairs of a nation state for the purpose of changing the state's method of government. Nation-building also includes efforts to promote institutions which will provide for economic well-being and social equity (Carson, 2003, p.2). Post-war Sri Lanka's nation building efforts are a deviation from the American notion of nation building and refer to a range of activities to assist civilians to build up the social fabric disturbed by a 30 year long war.

Thus, the case of Sri Lanka shows how to use military as a tool, as a social utility without disconnecting military activity from their social purpose. The immediate aftermath of the war entrusted the military with the task of resettling IDPs. In May 2009, a Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development

and Security in the Northern Province (PTF) was established to resettle the IDPs and develop the North in liaison with the military. The estimated number of IDPs as of May 2009 was 284,000 all of whom were resettled by September 2012 with the help of the Wannu Security Forces Headquarters and the Mullaitivu Security Forces Headquarters (Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, 2012). Since May 2009, the military continued to assist the resettled people to build their houses and resume their livelihoods.

The intervention made by the military after 2009 includes not only development of infrastructure but also the uplifting of socio-economic status of those who are living in the North and East of Sri Lanka. It includes community services such as rehabilitation and vocational training for ex-LTTE combatants, donation of equipment for school children and conducting seminars for school children, sponsoring of educational tours for school students, providing special lunch for children, leadership training for school children, as well as training on self-employment and entrepreneurship. It is indeed heartening to note that areas that have been given minimal attention by the government have been adeptly dealt with through the intervention of the military. Having observed that hundreds of school students in Tamil and Sinhala dominated areas abstain from getting regular haircuts due to financial constraints, 22 Division of the Security Force Headquarters - East (SFHQ-E) has begun providing a regular service of Army barbers for haircuts of poor students. A team of barbers of the Army including members of the civil staff provide this service to remote schools in the East in consultation with school

authorities once in every two months (Sri Lanka Army, 2014).

Rehabilitation of former LTTE cadres is one of the most demanding responsibilities shouldered by the Sri Lankan government and the military. Since the conclusion of the battle, combatants including trained suicide bombers have been rehabilitated and released to their communities. As at April 21, 2014, a total number of 11,935 ex-LTTE combatants have been reintegrated this way. They are provided with vocational training in carpentry, masonry, and plumbing and a total of Rs. 129185 million has been allocated to cover the costs associated with this rehabilitation process from 2009-2013. All ex-child combatants were reintegrated in 17 stages from 20.10.2009 to 18.05.2010. By 2010, all former child soldiers have been returned to their parents after a rigorous rehabilitation and reintegration process. All former child soldiers are given a proper education and those who qualify for the Examinations of Ordinary Level and Advanced Level are given the opportunity to sit for these examinations with the knowledge gained through tutorials conducted prior to the examination. Out of these child soldiers, 169 trainees qualified to enter university (Rehabilitation to Rejoice, 2014).

Army troops are involved in diverse relief and reconstruction activities in other parts of the country as well. Rebuilding of houses that were damaged due to bad weather, and distribution of water bottles in drought affected areas have been carried out by military personnel. The military's quick response in re-building houses that were destroyed in a clash between two religious groups in Aluthgama and Beruwala areas is another such instance.

The owners of the affected property expressing their views on media showed their reluctance in the involvement of the National Housing Development Authority in the re-building of their houses and instead wanted the military to proceed with the work which shows that the public perceives the military as a trustworthy mechanism as opposed to other state-run institutions. More than 700 professionals including 15 engineers of the Engineering Service Regiment were deployed for the reconstruction of the houses and shops that were damaged in Aluthgama and Beruwala (Daily News, 2014).

Apparently a career with the military still appears attractive as evidenced by professionals now being recruited to the Sri Lanka Army Volunteer Force (SLAVF) under its 'Api Army' (We are Army) programme. This was a milestone event in the military history of Sri Lanka where professionals of government and private sectors such as medical officers, civil engineers, architects, IT professionals, accountants etc were enlisted to the (SLAVF) (Sri Lanka Army Volunteer Force, 2014). Another latest development in the military recruitment process took place when Sri Lanka Army recruited Tamil women in 2012 including ex-LTTE women wing members (The Hindu, 2012). This reflects the trust and confidence that the Tamil community – and also other communities – have on the security forces and the value they attribute to a career with the military.

The military also took the initial lead role in the Colombo City development and beautification projects. Trained military personnel are involved in restoring old building in the Colombo city and demonstrate of the meticulously

executed craftsmanship of the military. Additionally, 'Leadership Training Programme' for new university entrants has reached its fourth phase and the students are being taught and trained on areas such as discipline, leadership, personal management, endurance, collective responsibility, self after the country, national commitments, moral uplifting, capacity-building, resource-management, and communication (Sri Lanka Army, 2014).

What justifies the military's presence and its increased involvement in the post-war nation building process is the perception of society towards such development interventions. The demand for military assistance in nation building efforts stems from attraction that is not forcibly cultivated among people but is natural. Such attraction is born out of social knowledge about the craftsmanship, talent, and efficiency commonly associated with the military.

Establishing security in a post-conflict environment is indisputably a military responsibility. But the military in Sri Lanka has been able to present a model that far encompasses its traditional hard power-oriented role, and that needs to be emulated by similar post war nations that are struggling with their post-war nation building efforts led by a third party.

SOFT POWER OF THE MILITARY: FUTURE PROSPECTS

General Rupert Smith observes that the ultimate intention of future wars would not be aimed at territorial expansion but to capture the minds of the people and their intentions (Smith, 2007). Commenting on the attributes of modern warfare

he finds that modern operations are fundamentally different in nature to those in the past. He names modern warfare as "wars amongst the people" in contrast to the past model of industrial warfare. According to General Smith, war amongst the people represents six trends. 1) The strategic objective for which parties engage in conflict has changed from that hard, simple objective of the industrial war to soft, malleable objectives. In this context both deterrence and coercion too have become malleable objectives in which it includes the intentions of the opponent and not his territory, nor how big his army is, and not even necessarily the total annihilation of the opponent's forces by all means. The prime objective is to change his intentions. 2) The concept of state in conflicts is now absent. 3) These operations take place literally amongst the people. 4) These affairs are timeless. Industrial wars were fought to win quickly. However, wars amongst people require time tested strategies. 5) Modern wars are fought not at the cost of physical and human resources as opposed to old industrial wars that made use of an entire population of a country, its tanks and airplanes. 6) Modern wars make new use of old weapons and organizations (Smith, 2007).

General Smith's analysis further testifies to the fact that conventional warfare and conventional wars no longer exist in the contemporary times and therefore what requires is to enhance the utility of the military such that the new demands of changing times will be met in order that the use of force may be more successful. In this light it could be said that the military's role in post-war Sri Lanka has come a long way in combating a war

among people by creating conditions that do not permit hostilities that can lead to another civil war in the country. In its pursuit of achieving this objective, the military of Sri Lanka has converted itself to be a socially expensive but a highly sought after reserve of human potential in the country. The present status of the power of military in Sri Lanka, therefore, is defined by social acceptance.

However, future prospects of the soft power of the military are conditioned by the existence of a well-articulated national security strategy which encompasses adoption of both hard and soft power aspects in the national security strategy of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, despite their claims to be the proud bearer of the medallion for annihilating one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations have failed to have devised their own national security strategy to date. This lack of a comprehensive national security strategy that outlines a long term national plan on security is likely to impede the results emanating from the military engagement in nation building efforts.

From a theoretical perspective, a new framework which encompasses the intra-state aspects of soft power needs to be introduced because, as this paper has showed, the legitimacy of terms such as 'soft power' is likely to be overpowered by the theoretical usage of terms such as 'militarization.'

Additionally, in order to maintain soft power the military needs to constantly readjust its goals and aims to fit those of a post-war society because the expectations that await the military in such a society are different compared to those at the time of war. These changing

expectations involve a huge cost, which is social rather than monetary in nature, and which can only be satisfied with the use of soft power. The difficulty here lies in soft power being fluid and subject to change along with the changing priorities of different times. Therein also lies the effectiveness of soft power. As such, the nature of the military should be similarly fluid to allow easy adaption to such changes with careful but swift shifts in the strategy of exercising soft power.

The shift of the role of the military in Sri Lanka from hard to soft power took place promptly following the cessation of armed hostilities in order to address the new challenges arising from a no-war situation, thus requiring the retaining of soldiers (albeit in a different capacity) as well as the recruitment of new professionals and more sappers. Though purchasing modern ammunition can be done within weeks, it is far less challenging than establishing the ground for a better yielding of soft power. In other words, the initial cost of establishing soft power can be much higher than the aggrandizement of hard power. Such soft power may come in the form of defense strategies, and they may be more or less formal as informal soft power initiatives can be looked upon as a move against military professionalism. All too obviously, the merits of this military soft power will depend upon its relevance to future circumstances as well as to the performance of the military.

This paper analyzed the soft power aspect of the military in post-war Sri Lanka focusing on Joseph S. Nye's idea of soft power. Soft Power which emphasizes on power embedded in the attraction of a state has paid little attention to the

internal soft power aspect of a country. Rather it revolves around power relations among states. However, this concept on soft power can be expanded so as to incorporate internal power relations of a state. The paper attempted to look at military power, which predominantly falls under the category of hard power, from a soft power perspective.

Post-war Sri Lanka has been characteristically defined as being subjected to militarization. What these predominantly western informed viewpoints have failed to realize is the amount of soft power that the military has been able to produce and exert. However, it is important to understand that the present post-war development structure led by the military runs the risk of failing if it lacks a proper strategic plan to execute its power such that people continue to embrace it as a disciplined force of efficiency rather than view it as a tool of increasing state monopoly. Especially for small states like Sri Lanka that always run the risk of being a victim of asymmetric, fourth generation warfare, this caution is not only desirable but also necessary in a context where psychological war can be easily created and propagated in this age dominated by a continuous influx of information which again is a form of soft power.

The military in post-war Sri Lanka bears testimony to the way in which a fighting army is converted to a humanitarian task force. More importantly, the power of the military did not deplete but instead became more successful and evocative by demonstrating its soft powers through the transformation of military capability into a source of development and prosperity.

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